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Weaponizing Principles: Clinical Ethics Consultations & 
the Plight of the Morally Vulnerable 
 
Abstract 
Internationally, there is an on-going dialogue about how to professionalize ethics consultation 
services (ECSs).  Despite these efforts, one aspect of ECS-competence that has received scant 
attention is the liability of failing to adequately capture all of the relevant moral considerations in 
an ethics conflict.  This failure carries a high price for the least powerful stakeholders in the 
dispute. When an ECS does not possess a sophisticated dexterity at translating what stakeholders 
say in a conflict into ethical concepts or principles, it runs the risk of naming one side’s claims as 
morally legitimate and decrying the other’s as merely self-serving. The result of this failure is 
that one side in a dispute is granted significantly more moral weight and authority than the other.  
The remedy to this problem is that ECSs learn how to expand the diagnostic moral lens they 
employ in clinical ethics conflicts. 
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Weaponizing Principles: Clinical Ethics Consultations & 
the Plight of the Morally Vulnerable 
 
 
In the new movement to professionalize ethics consultation services (ECSs), there is 
universal call for increased skills and knowledge among those who conduct clinical ethics 
consults1. One central skill set considered requisite for competence in consultation is what the 
American professional bioethics organization terms “Ethical Assessment and Analysis Skills”2, 
under which falls the ability to “clarify relevant ethical concepts”3 and then “apply relevant 
ethical considerations”4. Although this criterion of ECS-competence is well and good in theory, 
implementing it effectively in practice is easier said than done.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1N. N. Dubler, M. P. Webber, D. M. Swiderski, the Faculty & the National Working Group for 
the Clinical Ethics Credentialing Project. Charting the Future. Hastings Center Report 2009; 
39(6): 29-33; American Society for Bioethics and Humanities’ Core Competencies Update Task 
Force. 2011. Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics Consultation: The Report of the 
American Society for Bioethics And Humanities (2nd ed.). Glenview, IL: American Society for 
Bioethics and Humanities; A. J. Tarzian & ASBH Core Competencies Update Task Force. 
Health Care Ethics Consultation: An Update on Core Competencies and Emerging Standards 
from the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities’ Core Competencies Update Task 
Force. American Journal of Bioethics 2013; 13(2): 3-13.	  
2	  ASBH, op cit. note 1, p. 22.	  
3 Ibid: 22. 
4	  Ibid: 23.	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One thorny difficulty with this criterion of ECS-competence that has received scant 
attention from reformers is the liability of failing to adequately capture all of the ethical 
considerations or moral reasons that undergird an ethics conflict – a failure that carries a high 
price for the least powerful stakeholders in a dispute. When an ECS does not possess a 
sophisticated dexterity at translating what stakeholders say in an ethics dispute into ethical 
concepts or principles, it runs the risk of naming one side’s claims as morally legitimate and 
decrying the other’s as merely self-serving – or even immoral. Deeming one side as having 
principles and the other side as merely having preferences, inclinations, self-interest, etc. creates 
an imbalance in the moral weight of each respective side, with one side benefiting by having 
significantly more “moral” power and authority than the other. While earnestly seeking to 
“clarity [the] relevant ethics concepts” and then “apply” them, the novice ECS can inadvertently 
weaponize the ethical principles they do recognize to detriment of the cause and claims anchored 
by the principles they don’t. 
One obvious proposal to address this liability is to simply demand that ECSs possess 
“advanced knowledge about ethical duties”5. But the solution of schooling ECSs to recognize a 
higher percentage of existing duties and principles is only a viable one if there is truly an 
exhaustive, definitive list, which I will argue here – and have elsewhere6 – is not the case.  In this 
essay, I will argue that clinical ethics conflicts that appear wildly imbalanced morally are often 
an artifact of unrecognized principles.  If I can make good on the claim that both sides in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Tarzian et al, op cit. note 1.	  
6	  A. Fiester. Why the Clinical Ethics We Teach Fails Patients. Academic Medicine 2007; 82(7): 
684-689; A. Fiester. Ill-Placed Democracy: Ethics Consultations And the Moral Status of 
Voting. Journal of Clinical Ethics 2011; 22(4): 23-32.	  
4 
	  
dispute are secured by legitimate ethical principles – one side with long-established principles 
and the other with possibly only nascent, half-articulated ones – then, in lopsided cases, the ECS 
that recognizes the principles of only one stakeholder has not illuminated the side of the 
righteous, but stacked the deck against the morally vulnerable.  
The remedy is for ECSs to learn how to expand the moral lens they bring to clinical 
ethics conflicts – not to learn better utilization or application of an existing, narrow set.   
 
I. The Principlist Paradigm vs. Moral Archaeology 
The problem of weaponizing principles begins with the false assumption that all of the 
pertinent bioethical principles and legitimate moral considerations relevant to clinical ethics 
disputes have already been articulated and are bound in number. With a belief in a limited 
arsenal of moral tools at one’s disposal, it is understandable that ECSs peer into their repository 
and apply the ethical principles they find waiting there.  The common repository used by 
American ECSs is "principlist" in composition7, based loosely on the theory of principlism set 
out by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress8.  But unlike the original theory, the “principlist 
paradigm” – as I have called it9 – operates like a short diagnostic check-list that scans for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7R. De Vries, L. Low & E. Bogdan-Lovis. 2008. Choosing Surgical Birth: Desire And The 
Nature of Bioethical Advice. In Naturalized Bioethics: Towards Responsible Knowing And 
Practice, H. Lindemann, M.U. Walker, & M. Verkerk, eds. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press.	  
8T. Beauchamp & J. Childress. 2001. The Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press.	  
9	  Fiester 2007, op. cit. note 6.	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handful of ethical considerations in clinical encounters and then makes its normative assessment 
based entirely on that reductive set of ethical concerns.  Of course, if the check-list were 
exhaustive of all of the moral considerations that arise in a clinical situation, then this mode of 
moral diagnosis would not be cause for alarm. But this ham-fisted use of principlism 
inadvertently leads us to detect only a limited range of existing moral considerations. The effect 
is a narrowing of the moral lens through which clinical ethics cases are viewed at the cost of 
missing other salient features and the moral obligations attached to them.  The cost of failing to 
recognize the salient moral considerations of one side of a dispute is that the principles that are 
recognized on the other side amass a disproportionate ethical heft in the debate to the point of 
being fortified as proof of ethical supremacy. 
The problem is not the employment of “principles” as the unit of moral analysis, as critics 
who have raised parallel concerns have maintained10.  It’s our abuse of them.  It is the severe 
curtailment of the set of pertinent ethical concepts utilized in bioethics. ECSs, trained to spot 
only a handful of principles, are blinded to obligations that fall outside the limited range of 
principles or concepts articulated by the dominant theoretical and conceptual models of the 
field11.  This view of a finite set of moral considerations isn’t even consistent with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  S. Toulmin. The Tyranny of Principles. Hastings Center Report 1981; 11(6): 31-39.	  
11	  Beauchamp & Childress op cit. note 8; R. Gillon. Ethics Needs Principles: Four Can 
Encompass the Rest – and Respect for Autonomy Should Be “First among Equals.” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 2003; 29: 307-312; R. Veatch. Resolving Conflict among Principles: Ranking, 
Balancing, and Specifying. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1995; 5: 199-218; B. Gert, C. 
Culver & K.D. Clouser. 1997. Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals. New York, NY: Oxford 
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philosopher notorious for having only one formal principle: Immanuel Kant.  On Kant’s view, 
nicely explained for the context of bioethics by Bert Heinrichs, the “Categorical Imperative” 
spins off a “multitude of material principles”12 that flesh out the myriad, complex obligations we 
have to each other.  As Heinrichs puts it, the “multitude” honors “the diversity of moral life”13, 
and, as Barbara Herman argues, it must expand as moral perception and moral insight evolve14.  
The moral arsenal created by bioethics treats as static and fixed what should be understood as an 
ever-enlarging set. The role for an ECS is to engage in “moral archaeology” – a systematic 
uncovering of the moral values, interests, principles, and laws at play in an ethics dispute15 – not 
the rote application of a small set of ethical concepts that many have railed against16.  
In fact, the method of moral archaeology has strong echoes of the central strategy and 
insight of the casuists17. Casuistry recognizes this same need to expand the moral lens by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University Press; Gordon, Rauprich, Vollman 2011 JS. Gordon, O. Rauprich & J. Vollmann. 
Applying the Four-Principle Approach. Bioethics 2011; 25 (6): 293-300	  
12	  B. Heinrichs. Single-Principle Versus Multi-Principle Approaches in Bioethics. Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 2010; 27 (1): 72-83, p. 73.	  
13	  Ibid: 81.	  
14	  B. Herman. 1996. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.	  
15	  A. Fiester. Mediation and Recommendation. American Journal of Bioethics 2013; 13 (2): 23-
24, p. 24.	  
16	  Toulmin, op cit. note 10; J. Arras. Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in 
Bioethics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1991; 16(1): 29-51	  
17	  Arras, op cit. note 16, p. 37.	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focusing on what Arras calls “moral diagnosis”18.  Two decades ago, Arras articulated the 
casuistical approach as a “derivation of…principles” “develop[ed] incrementally through the 
analysis of concrete cases”19, enabling “principles…to emerge gradually from reflection upon 
our responses to particular cases”20.  This strategy is mirrored in the work of the hermeneutical 
school of clinical ethics consultation, in which the theoretical apparatus that one brings to case 
analysis is best viewed as “dynamic frameworks” that are “responsive to practice.”21  And 
bioethics – at its best – does exactly that.  In fact, the whole history of bioethics’ development as 
a field can be viewed as the articulation of novel principles that bring into relief newly 
recognized obligations or moral considerations.22  Moral orthodoxy should be the anathema of a 
field in the business of changing the way people think about the ethical dilemmas of medicine 
and science.  And yet, we repeatedly find that yesterday’s radical moral change not only 
becomes today’s bioethical dogma, but one viewed as a moral truth tracing back to time 
immemorial.  Take but one example: it was not that long ago that the state’s interest in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Ibid.	  
19	  Ibid: 31.	  
20	  Ibid: 33.	  
21 R. Proz, E. Landeweer, & G. Widdershoven. Theory and Practice of Clinical Ethics Support 
Services: Narrative and Hermeneutical Perspectives. Bioethics 25: 354-360, at 357. 
22 It is important to note that bioethics is not the only field that is generative of such novel moral 
principles.  Another good example is the construct of “sexual harassment” forged by Catherine 
MacKinnon in the late 70’s.  I thank the anonymous reviewer for this helpful point.  See, C. 
MacKinnon. 1979. Sexual harassment of working women: A case of sex discrimination. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
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preserving life was understood to trump a competent patient’s refusal of treatment – whatever 
their moral or religious reasons.  From the landmark US Quinlan decision: “Simply stated, the 
right to religious beliefs is absolute but conduct in pursuance thereof is not wholly immune from 
governmental restraint. So it is that, for the sake of life, courts sometimes (but not always) order 
blood transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses (whose religious beliefs abhor such procedure)”23. 
Today, the right of a Jehovah’s Witness to refuse blood products is an unquestionable doctrine 
taught to all American nursing and medical trainees.  Bioethics generates new moral principles 
(or is at least responsible for their newfound recognition) and then treats them as if they were 
acknowledged all along: it is a short distance from casuistical discovery to timeworn canon. But 
the lesson of patients’ rights for religious minorities – or the actual Quinlan case itself – is that 
there is an ever-expanding set of salient moral principles. Bioethics’ history belies a determinate 
set of “material,” or what in bioethics are often referred to as “middle level”24, bioethical 
principles. 
If the supposition of a delimited set of moral considerations is wrong (and the casuists 
have it right), then we must have a stance of looking for principles archaeologically, especially if 
the stakes of failing to see them are as high as I will claim.  
 
II. Excavating Unrecognized Principles 
One possible counter to evidence of past ethical discoveries, such as obligations to the 
Jehovah Witness faithful, is that there simply are no more principles to be found.  Bioethics has 
come of age, one might argue, and the work of the past forty years has exhausted the moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	   In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), p.19.	  
24	  Beauchamp & Childress, op. cit. note 8.	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terrain.  To demonstrate that this objection is false and that the need to mine cases for new 
principles is as pressing as ever, let’s look at a sample case, the conventional bioethical 
interpretation of it, and what additional moral principles might be found there.  As we try to 
unearth ethical features of the case not standardly recognized in bioethical analysis, we should be 
wary of limiting our lens to “principles” as the sole moral entities.  Much handwringing in the 
field has hinged on concerns about “principles”25, and the bioethical obsession with principles 
has likely blinded us to more nuanced readings of bioethical cases and situations.  To avoid this 
baggage, I will refer interchangeably to a generic class of moral entities that speak to “what we 
owe each other”26: e.g., “principles,” “obligations,” “virtues,”27 “moral considerations” and 
“moral reasons” – even what casuist Toulmin, in his tirade against “the tyranny of principles,” 
labels our “different rights and claims…and responsibilities”28.  For my argument, these 
metaethical distinctions do not matter.  The issue is whether one’s concerns, interests, claims, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Toulmin, op cit. note 10; K.D. Clouser & B. Gert. A Critique of Principlism. Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 1990; 15: 219-236; Arras op cit. note 10; E. Emanuel. The Beginning 
of the End of Principlism. Hastings Center Report 1995; 25 (4): 37-38.	  
26	   T. Scanlon. 2000. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.	  
27 I include the “virtues” in the set of moral entities that describes what we owe to each other.  
Although a Kantian in stripe, I believe that the contrast between Kantian and Aristotelian ethics 
has been too sharply drawn.  Following Barbara Herman, I believe that the best reading of Kant 
is to recognize the virtues as duty-bound.  See, for example, B. Herman. 1996. Making Room for 
Character. In Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. S. Engstrom and J. Whiting, eds. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 36-60. 
28	  Toulmin, op cit. note 10.	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views can be legitimately framed in moral terms, or whether they are instances of non-moral 
self-interest29.  It is worth noting that I am employing a classical Kantian dichotomy here of 
“moral” versus “non-moral” motives.  For Kant, the central question is whether the 
underpinnings of our actions are “from duty or from some purpose of self-interest”30. In this 
Kantian framework, “self-interest” does not mean “selfish,” but rather “not sourced in a moral 
duty to either oneself or others.”31  My concern is that some stakeholders involved in clinical 
ethics consults will have their moral motives mistaken for non-moral ones. 
The case I want to examine is taken from the second edition of Nancy Dubler and Carol 
Liebman’s book, Bioethics Mediation32.  The case, "She Didn't Mean It," is one of the role plays 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Herman, op cit. note 14; Fiester 2011, op cit. note 6.	  
30	  I. Kant. 1964. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. H.J. Paton, trans. New York, NY: 
Harper and Row, p. 9.	  
31 Although Kantian exegesis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning that the 
distinction between moral and non-moral motives is not intended to exclude the virtues from the 
set of morally worthy motives.  There is a great deal of hand-wringing over what Kant meant by 
his exclusion of “virtuous motives,” but I follow Barbara Herman’s interpretation that “virtuous 
motives” are not co-equal to motives anchored in Aristotelian conceptions of virtues.  On that 
view, Kant’s intention in this passage in the Groundwork (Kant, op cit. note 28) is to exclude 
motives based solely on emotion because feelings are not stable; it is not evidence of a stance on 
virtues as moral entities.  For a robust discussion of these issues, see J. Wuerth, ed. 2010. 
Perfecting virtue: Kantian ethics and virtue ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
32	  N. Dubler & C. Liebman. 2011. Bioethics Mediation: A Guide to Shaping Shared Solutions. 
Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.	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included in the volume, and it comes with both a transcript of a sample mediation of the case, as 
well as an accompanying commentary from the authors.  I have chosen it because it lends itself 
to a stock bioethical analysis – one that Dubler and Liebman explicitly call into question.  Here is 
the summary they provide of the case:  
Mrs. Dee is an elderly woman, critically ill with multiple medical problems, currently in the ICU. She's on 
a ventilator and her blood pressure is falling, even though she is on medication to support her pressure. She 
has had one episode in which the staff felt they might need to attempt resuscitation, but the patient 
stabilized and remains in the same tenuous condition. Mrs. Dee's kidneys have failed, and the renal 
consultant raised the possibility of dialysis. Mrs. Dee made a living will years ago that she later affirmed, 
stating that if critically ill and unlikely to recover she should not get dialysis, a ventilator, or artificial 
hydration or nutrition and that she should have a DNR order. She also stated that she never wanted to be a 
burden to her family. Her named health care proxy is her husband, who has since become severely 
demented. Mrs. Dee has been his primary caretaker at home. The Dee’s have two grown children, Pat and 
Tanner. Tanner, who wants to honor her mother's intentions, just heard that the nephrologist got Pat to sign 
consent for dialysis and is very upset33. 
 
If we imagine a conventional ethics consult on this case, the ECS would likely cite the 
principle of autonomy, arguing that the mother’s clearly stated treatment preferences in her 
advance directive and her right to refuse death-prolonging care are being violated by her son on 
grounds of pure self-interest, namely, his selfish desire to keep her alive despite her wishes.  
Although the ECS might feel sympathy for Pat and the sad circumstances he finds himself in, 
they would find little moral weight in his contention that his mother “didn’t mean it” and no 
moral legitimacy in his decision to consent to starting dialysis.  The stance of the usual ECS is 
nicely summarized in the role play transcript by the patient advocate, who states definitively, 
“[I]t’s not really what [the patient’s children] want; it’s what the patient wants. If she has made 
up her mind about how she wants to take care of herself towards the end of life, we have to 
respect that, because her intentions were made clear when she signed [the living will]. [W]e are 
duty bound to respect that and to just follow it”34.  Invoking a duty to respect the patient’s wishes 
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  Ibid: 197.	  
34	  Ibid: 258.	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on the one side of the moral equation while flagging the mere “wants” of the children on the 
other makes the situation ethically quite cut and dry.  The sole position in the conflict that is 
tethered by moral principle must necessarily be allowed to dictate the medical course of action.  
Not only should dialysis not be started, but there should be a DNR order in the chart and perhaps 
even steps taken to withdraw Mrs. Dee’s ventilator, as per her living will.  Grief counseling 
and/or pastoral care can be procured to comfort Pat, but he cannot be allowed to continue to 
wrong his mother. 
 This account should sound familiar, since it is the conventional bioethical analysis of a 
very commonplace conflict, and the subsequent recommendations are the standard fare of a 
typical ECS.  On this account, all of the moral weight clearly falls disproportionately to one side, 
in a lopsided conflict that can conjure up absolutely no ethical justification for the other. Pat has 
no good moral reasons for his position, so he must yield. 
 The impetus for questioning this striking moral lopsidedness is that Pat does not believe 
he is wronging his mother.  In fact, his claim is that “she didn’t mean it”: i.e., despite whatever is 
literally written in the advance directive she signed, it does not tell the whole story about her 
values and wishes in the current situation as it unfolded.  But Pat cannot get any further than that 
in making his ethical case.  He can’t translate his gut feelings or intuitions into anything like the 
powerful ethical principle the ECS has produced to defend their position.  He has no moral 
weapons to combat their powerful claims and defend his own: Pat is morally vulnerable. 
 Are there unrecognized moral principles in Pat’s position that he can’t articulate and the 
ECS fails to see?  Dubler, Liebman, and I believe there are.  I will defend two such principles: 
the first is anchored by a commitment to family-centered care articulated by Dubler and Liebman 
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in the commentary included with the case; and the second is my own, born out of a critique of an 
overly narrow understanding of autonomy. 
 The first principle is embedded in the rationale Dubler and Liebman offer for 
circumventing the mother’s advance directive.  In a radical departure from patient-autonomy 
orthodoxy, they write, “The dynamics of the family are such that if the patient is not suffering, 
his or her wishes must sometimes be subordinated, at least temporarily, to the emotional needs of 
the family members, for they must live with the solution and the consequences after the patient 
dies”35.  In the case of Mrs. Dee, we have an unconscious patient whose sedation levels suggest 
that she is not aware of any pain or discomfort.  In such a case, we might think of the pertinent 
principle as an obligation to (sometimes) prioritize the needs of family members over patients.  
This obligation follows directly from the insight of the US family-centered care movement that 
there is more than one person in the room who matters morally, more than one who can be 
harmed36.  It is also consistent with the “dialogical” clinical ethics model that is part of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	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  J. Davidson, et al. Clinical Practice Guidelines for Support of the Family in the Patient-
Centered Intensive Care Unit: American College of Critical Care Medicine Task Force 2004-
2005. Critical Care Medicine 2007; 35 (2): 605-622;J.R. Curtis & D.B. White. Practical 
Guidelines for Evidence-Based ICU Family Conference. Chest 2008; 134 (4): 835-843; L. 
Leape, D. Berwick, C. Clancy et al. Transforming Healthcare: A Safety Imperative. Qual Saf 
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European conversation about ECS.37  Again, invoking Scanlon’s famous description of the set of 
our moral obligations as being “what we owe each other”38, the family-centered care proponents 
recognize that “mattering” in this context means that we “owe” family members a sincere effort 
in safeguarding their well-being and helping them avoid harm and injury.  
This sincere effort to find a resolution to the conflict that “meets the emotional needs of 
the family”39 undergirds Dubler and Liebman’s unorthodox approach to living wills.  Both 
trained as lawyers, Dubler and Liebman block the rejoinder that advance directives are legally 
sacrosanct. They continue: “Living wills are important, but in the clinch of hard decisions they 
amount to just one more piece of information that must be factored into a solution”40.  
Anticipating the sharp rebuke from the clinical ethics stalwarts, they retort, “Why is [the advance 
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directive] not the end of the matter? Their answer is that in medical care there are ethical 
obligations to all the parties in the decision structure”41.   
A second moral principle that bolsters Pat’s position comes from Pat himself, albeit in 
nascent, inchoate form.  In the mock role play included in the Dubler and Liebman text, Pat says, 
“She would want to be available for Dad and to be there for us”42.  This claim can appear to be 
merely self-serving – in fact, it can appear to lend support to the interpretation that Pat has no 
moral reasons for his stance.  He seems to be suggesting that a dying woman should sacrifice her 
own healthcare needs and preferences for the benefit of others’ needs.  Doesn’t this suggestion 
shine a poor light on Pat?  Isn’t asking for self-sacrifice from the dying morally suspect?  
Commenting on a very similar case, Jecker (2001) takes this concern one step further, leveling 
what she calls a “feminist critique” in response to the ECS recommendation that treatment 
continue43.  Her claim is that a sexist bias denies “women’s moral agency,” allowing us to ignore 
a woman’s clearly stated wishes in deference to the wishes or needs of others44. But Jecker might 
be too hasty here.  Nested in Pat’s claim is an attempt to articulate his mother’s own moral code 
and thus to enhance, rather than deny, her moral agency.   
Reaching beyond the limits of what an advance directive could possibly reveal about a 
patient’s deepest moral commitments, Pat asserts that his mother would not want to forego or 
withdraw life-sustaining therapy if her family needed her to continue with it.  This might be 
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framed as a principle of staying alive for the sake of others, and there is a great deal of intuitive 
plausibility to it. While one applauds Jecker’s feminist impulse to safeguard women’s 
autonomous decisions, it would be an overly narrow interpretation of the autonomous agent – 
male or female – if individuals were construed as autonomous if and only if they made decisions 
without regard for the welfare of others, especially those nearest and dearest to them.  In fact, 
Jecker’s is a fairly idiosyncratic feminist view.  The far more predominant feminist ethics of 
care45 would likely take quite seriously Pat’s implicit claim about the central importance of his 
mother’s emotional connections and the obligations she would believe follow from them.  When 
she signed the advance directive, she stated that “she never wanted to be a burden to her family.”  
What if she had understood that the hastening of her death, rather than the extension of her life, 
would actually place the deeper burden on them?  Would she then have written the living will in 
the same way she did?   The problem with advance directives is that they are made prospectively, 
unavoidable without knowing all of the facts of the future circumstance that the patient will be 
in, some of which might be grounds for negating what was in the advance directive.   Mrs. Dee 
might never have written what she did if she had known what it would have cost her son Pat. 
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This way of looking at the problem sheds new light on Pat’s contention that “she didn’t 
mean it,” that is, she didn’t intend to demand something from her family that would cause them 
pain or harm.  Of course, in the case, there is only Pat’s testimony that his mother held this view, 
but wouldn’t most parents, if they were unconscious and could not perceive any pain or 
suffering, agree to a state of existence with no physical cost to them, if it would significantly 
help their children?  Wouldn’t parents willingly to do much more?  
It may be that these principles need further justification and argument, but their status as 
nascent doesn’t make them untrue.  There is at least a prima facie case that Pat does, indeed, 
have solid moral reasons backing his anti-withdrawal stance. 
 
III. The Duty to Protect the Morally Vulnerable 
 
If the moral claims Pat is struggling to articulate are valid, then the earlier ethical analysis 
of the conventional ECS is not only flawed, but it maligns Pat in the process.  The ECS analysis 
accuses Pat of, at best, acting selfishly out of grief, and, at worst, violating the personhood of a 
dying patient.  This denigration is particularly egregious because Pat is victim to a kind of 
susceptibility that I will term “moral vulnerability.”  Formally, I define moral vulnerability as 
“the condition of having unarticulated or unrecognized moral principles that make one’s position 
difficult to defend with the consequence of being deemed to be acting on pure self-interest.”  
Rather than undermining, or even crippling, the morally vulnerable in an ethics consult, ECSs 
have a duty to buttress and fortify the claims of the morally vulnerable by mining their positions 
for moral content.  
Why should this be understood as an obligation of an ECS?  The answer is simple: 
because when an ECS fails stakeholders in this way, they cause them harm. To be blinded to the 
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moral reasons of one side in an ethics dispute is more than a misdemeanor of omission. The 
consequence of this blindness is that the ECS becomes complicit in turning the ethics dispute 
into an inherently unfair fight between the “have’s” and “have-not’s, i.e., those who possess the 
moral might of principles or moral reasons and those who don’t.  The ECS inadvertently use the 
power and authority that comes with moral explanation to diminish the claims of stakeholders 
that cannot produce their own counter moral arguments.  The mandate of ECSs in seemingly 
lopsided ethics conflicts needs to be a search for the moral claims that underlie the ethically 
weaker side.  The stance I have taken is not unique to the Kantian perspective; it is echoed in the 
moral deliberation school of clinical ethics consultation.46  
This invites an obvious objection: what if there really are no moral reasons behind 
someone’s stance in a clinical ethics dispute?  I admit to a deep skepticism about that possibility.  
Rumors of family members being motivated by the continuing welfare check or a speedy 
inheritance are legendary, but they may also be caricatures or distortions of those stakeholders’ 
true views.  Until we remedy our scathingly bad track record of uncovering the sincere moral 
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commitments of people like Pat, these uncharitable interpretations should at least be resisted as a 
last resort.  Let’s implement an approach to discovering the genuine moral reasons of 
stakeholders, and then we can see how many cases of pure self-interest persist. 
But what about a second, more threatening objection to my argument: how do we know 
ECSs ever use moral principles as weapons against the morally vulnerable?  After all, there have 
been so few studies of ECSs, and the data that do exist reveal general features of consult 
services, not details about their inner workings47.  My first response is that this fact highlights the 
field’s desperate need for more thorough empirical research on ECSs – qualitative, ethnographic, 
and participant observer, as well as quantitative and statistical. My second response is that while 
it is true that I cannot provide hard empirical data to prove this phenomenon, I can provide data 
of another kind: the trope of the self-centered family member.  How often in clinical ethics 
discussions is there a stock character in the conflict who is deemed interested only in receiving 
the patient’s welfare check, or keeping a loved one alive out of guilt, or having a selfish inability 
to let go?  They are certainly the hackneyed staple of the ECSs I witness. Dubler and Liebman’s 
concern in the case “She Didn’t Mean It” is important, not because it is so rare, but because it is 
so commonplace. 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
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As important conversations continue about the criterion for ECS-competence, the 
neglected problem of unrecognized principles and the liability they hold for stakeholders needs 
to become part of the dialogue.  The failure to recognize the moral claims of disputants in a 
clinical ethics conflict reduces the consultant to a moral bully rather than a fount of moral 
insight.  Rather than merely being armed with a small set of orthodox bioethical principles, ECSs 
need to be taught how to mine cases for their morally relevant considerations, to think broadly 
and contextually about what stakeholders are saying, and to unearth the deeply held values and 
interests that are driving the positions various stakeholders take.   
What does this mean concretely for the education and credentialing of ECSs? It means 
that accompanying instruction in the standard set of bioethical principles and concepts should be 
training in the process of moral archaeology – the casuists’ skill of mining cases, testimonials, 
and statements for their moral content.  It means teaching consultants how to generate an 
expansive, inclusive set of moral considerations that accurately represent the most morally 
generous interpretation of the positions of the stakeholders involved in the conflict.  Mediation 
training is instructive here: ECSs need to be schooled in the perils of framing conflicts from only 
one perspective, learning costs of reframe the conflict from the perspective of each and every 
stakeholder just as mediators do.  The rubric for assessing ECS mastery of this skill is quite 
simple: can the ECS provide a moral justification for the stance taken by each individual 
stakeholder in the conflict?   
In the absence of this skill, ECSs will inevitably confer moral legitimacy on only one side 
of the dispute at the likely peril of the morally vulnerable. 
 
